Sunday 23 December 2012

SOME CULTURAL PRACTICES THAT VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS


SOME CULTURAL PRACTICES THAT VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
by Orjiebele Malachy
INTRODUCTION
Human rights have become the most important topic of debate and of course controversy in recent times. The ideal and ideas of Human Rights, has come to settle with many people and to bear meaning in the values of people of multifarious cultural heterogeneities, wherever they are found. Human rights have come to stand as a value upon which many other values are measured. And therefore, it is a considerable program for mankind on earth.
Therefore, that man has a right to life, to the integrity of his or her body and to adequate living conditions, that the freedom of conscience, of religion and the expression of opinion are to be respected, that all are equal before the law and all have a right to participate in the public affairs that are of concern to everyone, and that any kind of discrimination is to be rejected, all these and much more meets throughout the world with broad consensus, even if theoretically. The obligation to respect such inalienable human rights has been recognised by almost all states since the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Of course we must immediately mention that the reality in many countries of the world today including Nigeria neither corresponds with the letter, nor still less with the spirit of this solemn pledge.
It is in this light that we shall highlight certain cultural practices in Nigeria that violate certain human rights, especially, these rights as represented in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011); sections 33 to 46. In going about this, we shall give an understanding of what human rights consist in as well as its characteristics, and examine some of the sources of human rights. Then we shall consider its representation in the constitution and this will enable us to highlight some cultural practices that violate these human rights.
Now there is another part to the whole conspectus of our endeavour here which is to enumerate the sources of Nigerian Law and explain any three of them. This will of course come after we have highlighted some cultural practices that violate human rights in Nigeria.

UNDERSTANDING WHAT HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIST IN
Human rights are entitlements that a person has simply because he or she is a human being. Human rights refer to the "basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled. Examples of rights and freedoms which have come to be commonly thought of as human rights include civil and political liberties and rights.”[1]
Civil rights is used to imply that the state has a positive role in ensuring all citizens equal protection under law and equal opportunity to exercise the privileges of citizenship and otherwise to participate fully in national life, regardless of race, religion, sex, or other characteristics unrelated to the worth of the individual. Civil liberties is used to refer to guarantees of freedom of speech, press, or religion; to due process of law; and to other limitations on the power of the state to restrain or dictate the actions of individuals. The two concepts of equality and liberty are overlapping and interacting; equality implies the ordering of liberty within society so that the freedom of one person does not infringe on the rights of others, just as liberty implies the right to act in ways permitted to others.

Characteristics of Human Rights
·        Human rights are inalienable. This means that you cannot afford to lose those rights as long as you are a human being. This implies that such rights must be upheld. Consequently, if one fails to use such rights, he/she is liable to punishment.
·        Human rights are indivisible. No one can agree to be denied a right because it is less important or non-essential.
·        Human rights are interdependent: all human rights are part of a complementary framework. For example, your ability to participate in your government is directly affected by your right to express yourself, to get an education, and even to obtain the necessities of life. Your ability to live life under a humane condition directly affects your right to life. Your right to education enables you enjoy rights to freedom of expression.
·        Human rights also refer to those basic standards without which people cannot live in dignity. Therefore to violate somebody’s right is to treat that person as though he/she were not a human being. To advocate human rights is to demand that the human dignity of all people be respected.



Sources of Human Rights
Human rights began to have international importance after the Second World War in 1945.The World War II was therefore the catalyst that propelled international human rights movement.
Throughout much of history, people acquired rights and responsibilities through their membership in a group – a family, indigenous nation, religion, class, community, or state. Most societies have had traditions similar to the “golden rule” of “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”.
 The Hindu Vedas, the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, the Bible, the Quoran (Koran), and the Analects of Confucius are five of the oldest written sources which address questions of people’s duties, rights, and responsibilities. In addition, the Inca and Aztec codes of conduct and justice and Iroquois Constitution were Native American sources, whether in oral or written tradition, have had systems of propriety and justice as well as ways of tending to the health and welfare of their members.
Every African society has customary or traditional rules that regulate lives of people and which imbibe human rights concepts, e.g. unlawful killing attracts the wrath of the society and restitution were used to redress violations of other people’s rights. Nonetheless, there were still some cultural practices that violate human rights, and we shall consider them now.
(a)   SOME CULTURAL PRACTICES THAT VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS
The cultural practices of the caste system (osu), pure or domestic slavery (ohu/oru), the pawning system (igba-ebe), genital mutilation (iwa-ukwu), and the killing of twins (igbu-ejima) as found in the culture of the Igbo people of Nigeria would be used to examine certain cultural practices which de-value human dignity and violate human rights. Let it be noted immediately that all these species of cultural practices that violate human rights have been legally abolished way back in 1956. We bring it up in this study for the sole purpose of highlighting certain cultural practices that violate human rights.

The Osu Caste System and Human Rights
The word ‘Osu’ has been designated the meaning of a “slave”, but one distinct from an ordinary slave (Ohu/Oru). The Osu is in fact the property of a god, and once devoted to a god, he or she has no prospects of regaining freedom and his or her movement is restricted to the precincts of the shrine to which he was attached. Another similar understanding is that Osu simply means a religious cult slave under the practice of the Igbo traditional religion and system of worship; a person who has been bought and dedicated to the services of the owner’s cult.[2]
Again, the 1956 Osu Bill, and as re-echoed in the 1963 Eastern Nigerian Law on the Osu System say that an “Osu may be a person who was sacrificed to a shrine or a deity, and that person and his descendants are therefore regarded as social pariahs with no social rights which non-Osus are bound to respect.”[3]
The Osu generally is discriminated upon in some despicable ways. From birth to death, the free-borns (diala) do not ever dare to rejoice over or celebrate the arrival of a new born baby delivered by an Osu as they do not sympathise or lament over mishaps on them. As such at the death of an Osu, the Dialas do not participate in the digging of the grave, carrying of the corpse or coffin or even take part during the burial of an Osu, and this is as the traditions and customs hold it to be.
The Osus are not expected to dance to the tune of the exclusive and symbolic male dance of the free-born. The Diala does not walk across the legs of an Osu, shave him or be shaven by him. He or she does not have sexual dealings with an Osu or allow all other conventional social associations with anybody referred to as such.
From the foregoing, it becomes clear that the Osu Caste System contravenes and violates the human rights as enunciated in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011), sections 33 to 46.
In section 34, Right to Dignity of Human Person, the  Osu’s treatment runs contrary to the provisions of the constitution, that no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment (§ 1a). Also it violates the rights that no person shall be held in slavery or servitude (§ 1b), and no person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour (§ 1c).
The cultural practice of the Osu Caste System violates the Right to Personal Liberty as enunciated in CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 35 § 1. This states that every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty... The Osu as the case was, was denied of this very right to personal liberty, since by the total ostracisation of them, they were already confined within a giving radius else they come and contaminate the land.
The Osu is denied the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion as seen in the Sect. 37 §1 of CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011. Once one is born an Osu, one remains an Osu till death, with no freedom of thought or even conscience as he or she must behave as the society expects him or her to behave, - like an Osu.
The Osu caste system also violates the Right to Freedom of Expression and the Press (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 39 §§ 1, 2, and 3), the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Association (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 40) and the Right to Freedom of Movement (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 41 §§ 1and 2), since in the first place, having been ostracised they do not have any place or say in community matters, they are not allowed to freely mingle and associate with other members of the community by virtue of their state as Osu and ultimately they have been confined within a specific radius(i) in the community.

The Ohu/Oru Practice and the Human Rights
The practice of slavery (Ohu/Oru) differs from the Osu Caste system in that it requires no sacrifices and dedication of human beings to deities. Rather an Ohu (a slave) is a person  bought with money, expected in addition to render services to his master at whose discretion it is also to use the person so bought for some other purpose for which he or she so wishes. The emphasis here is on - “bought with money, expected in addition to render services to his master” - thus we get the idea of pure slavery as different from domestic slavery.
In domestic slavery, one became a slave who is “a lazy child, a victim of political machination, an unprotected/unguided stranger, a stray child or inter-tribal war captives” (Okeke I.R.J, 1986: 80). In any case these domestic slaves were subjected to dehumanizing and derogatory uses like using them as sacrificial lambs when the gods of the land were to be appeased. In short, domestic slaves were also used to ward-off calamities that could have befallen the families of their masters.
In juxtaposition of these cultural practices with the fundamental human rights as represented in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011), sections 33 to 46, we realise that they seriously violate the human rights.
For one they violate the Right to Dignity of Human Person (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 34), this is so because the human person is herewith being used as an economic commodity, as a means of exchange, and being subjected to undue labour (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 34 § 1 a, b, and c).
This practice of slavery also contravenes the Right to Personal Liberty (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 35). The slave is not allowed any liberty or freedom to choose what he or she wishes to do, or even allowed to exercise his or her freewill. The slave by coercion does solely the will of the master.
It as much contravenes the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 38). The long and short here is that the slave becomes less a person by the treatment he or she receives since he or she is no longer allowed to exercise any freedom at all.
Finally, the practice of slavery wholly contravenes and violates the Right to Freedom of Expression and the Press (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 39), the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Association (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 40, the Right to Freedom of Movement (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 41), and the Right to Freedom of Discrimination (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 42). Since the slave has no freedom, his or her enslaved status violates all these human rights that emphasises on freedom.

The Igba-Ebe (Pawning) System and the Human Rights
Pawning or Igba-Ebe is another form of enslavement. Okeke I.R.J, 1986: 90 says that the League of Nations in the forties defined it as “an institution which the person attaches to a debt to whomsoever the dept is transferred, so also is the person.” For a simpler understanding, Igba-Ebe (pawning) is the mortgaging of human beings particularly male teenage, for the acquisition of one’s needs, cash or kind. It can also be described  as a collateral security as done in the bank today to obtain a loan, which in the case of pawning will be to obtain service.
The distinguishing factor between a pawn and a slave is in the fact that the pawning system has to do with lending or engagement of service, consequently, one can buy a slave but could only engage a pawn on clearly spelt out terms.
Now it still boils down to the fact that the practice of the pawning system is an act that contravenes the human rights. Considering the fact that the human person is being used as a means to an end, as a collateral for a commodity acquired, and more so when it applies to children it is child labour we understand even better then how it violates the fundamental human rights especially as enunciated in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011), sections 33 to 46.
It therefore amounts to the fact that the pawning system violates the Right to Dignity of Human Person (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 34), the Right to Personal Liberty (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 35), and the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 38). This is so as the pawn will necessarily do the bidding of whom he or she is indebted to, and this de-values human dignity, limits the individual’s (pawn) freedom and liberty, and constricts the person’s thought and expression of his or her deepest rumination.

 Iwa-Ukwu (Genital Mutilation) and Human Rights
Genital mutilation also regarded as Female circumcision in some circumstances “involves removing part or all of a woman’s labia and clitoris and is usually performed on girls entering adolescence.” (Encyclopaedia of Microsoft Encarta, 2009)  This practice is painful, and often harmful, to the women, despite the fact that the community claims that the practice is important and deeply rooted in their culture.
No matter what they claim, the practice is actually a mutilation as rightly called. Hence, it is a violation of human rights when young girls are brutalized by the painful and degrading practice of genital mutilation. This simply has to do with the surgical modification of women’s sexual organs, usually without their consent as those concerned are adolescents.
            This practice therefore contravenes and violates the Right to Dignity of Human Person (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 34), since it toils with human (female) sexuality which is the pride and the very essence of womanhood. Hence by such practices, the dignity of womanhood is de-valued and dragged to the mud.
Genital mutilation also violates the Right to Life (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 33) as it threatens the very life of the individual. This is so because cases abound where some of the victims of these practices have died from profuse bleeding after the mutilation. Also some of the girls have become carriers of some deadly diseases which they had contacted as a result of unsterilized instruments of surgery, especially when such practices are carried out by quarks. Hence the lives of the individual are seriously endangered by the practice of genital mutilation (iwa-ukwu).

Igbu-Ejima (Killing of Twins) and Human Rights
It was the practice in the eastern hemisphere of Nigeria, until the fight and subsequent abolition by Mary Slessor, that those children who were born twins were killed within the first seven days of birth. This practice was held unto, due to the understanding that for two people to come out of one womb was an abnormality and as such a taboo in the land. The belief was that if they were allowed to live that calamities would befall the land.
Now it has been stopped and I wonder how many calamities have befallen our communities. Nonetheless, this practice violates strongly the Right to Life (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011, Sect. 33). What is at stake here is the life of the individual children. In fact this can also be referred to as infanticide.
Infanticide, in criminal law, is referred to as the “killing of a newborn child by its parent or by another with the parent's consent” (Encyclopaedia of Microsoft Encarta, 2009). In most countries therefore, it is now considered a form of murder, and thus punishable by law.
Fair enough a good number of these cultural practices that violate human rights have been abolished and this is corroborated by the fact that the international community has become increasingly concerned with the protection of human rights. Although concern for human rights is expressed in the UN Charter, the development of specific norms related to human rights began in 1948 with the passage of two nonbinding declarations: the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, approved by the Organization of American States, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), approved by the UN.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) described a variety of rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and security of person; to freedom from slavery; to freedom of conscience, religion, opinion, expression, association, and assembly; to freedom from arbitrary arrest; to a fair and impartial trial; to privacy; and to education. This document remains the cornerstone of international human rights law and has been the basis of bills of rights in nearly 100 countries, Nigeria not an exception as this has found expression in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011); Chapter IV, Fundamental Human Rights, sections 33 to 46.

 (b) THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW
The sources of Nigerian law include:
§  The Constitution - Cited as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, 2011(CFRN, 1999, as amended 2011,)
§  The Received English Law
§  The Nigerian Legislation
§  Juridical Precedents
§  Customary Laws
§  Islamic/Sharia Law
We shall now attempt explanations of three of these sources of the Nigerian Law.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, 2011
 “Constitution is the system of laws, customs and conventions which defines the composition and powers of organs of the state, and regulates the relations of the various state organs to one another and to the private citizens.”[4] Constitution may also be called documents containing the substance of the law.

Features of the Nigerian Constitution as sources of the law
Ø  It is written – this means that both the past and the present Nigerian Constitutions are both written. The British has no written constitution. Their constitution which is unwritten is bound by customs and convention adapted to over time.
Ø  It is supreme – It has binding force on all authorities and persons in Nigeria. It is the grande norm (fundamental/ principal norm).
Ø  It is enacted so that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall only be governed in accordance to the provisions of the constitution
Ø  No other law should be inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution. If any other law is inconsistent, the constitution shall prevail and the other law shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency
Ø  The Constitution is superior to other laws of the land and regulates the juridical, executive and legislative arm of the government. The supremacy clause of the constitution is couched thus – “This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have biding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria – section 1.
Ø  The Constitution contains both the substantive and procedural provisions. Both provisions are supreme. Substantive provisions are the rules which define the rights, duties, liabilities and obligations of persons. Procedural provisions are the rules of practice and procedure relating to the ways in which these rights, duties, liabilities and obligations are enforced in proceedings before the courts of law. The substantive laws which are enumerated are:
-         Exclusive Legislative List: This is enacted only by the national assembly.
-         Concurrent Legislative List: As the name suggests, could be enacted both by the national assembly and the state house of assembly.
Laws that are not enumerated are residual matters. (Cf., S. 4 (7) CFRN, See S 4 generally for the propositions above).
Ø  Rights and duties as well as rules which may be enforced under the law are contained in the Constitution. This shows that not all rights and duties are enforceable at law. Examples: agreements dealing with family relation; agreements that deals with puberty; agreements that are binding in honour.
Ø  The constitution is both prospective and progressive. It can catch up with anything in the past; invalidating any inconsistency in the past once amended.

The Nigerian Legislation
Another source of Nigerian Law is the Nigerian legislation. Here, we have both primary and subsidiary legislation.
v  Primary Legislations
Primary legislations are the laws emanating from the Major Legislative Arm of the government – the National Assembly. The national assembly comprises the house of senates and the House of Representatives. The state House of Assembly serves the interest of their respective states, while the National House of Assembly serves the interest of the nation. Their military equivalent in law is Decree while that of a state house of assembly is ‘edict’ during the military era. Examples of Nigerian Legislation include:
-         The criminal code
-         Companies and Allied
-         Marriage Act
-         Matrimonial Causes Act
-         Evidence Act
-         Criminal Procedure Law – (Southern Nigeria)
-         Criminal Procedure Act (North)
-         Arbitration Act.
v  Subsidiary Legislation
Other terms for subsidiary legislation are subordinate legislation, administrative legislation, delegated legislation, By-laws, etc. Examples of Delegated Legislations are:
-         Regulations issued by an administrative agent of the executive arm of government for running the affairs of the state.
-         Rules of procedure made by juridical authorities in respect of the matters coming before the court
-         Municipal by-laws enacted by local government council to regulate matters within their sphere of control.

Customary Laws
Another source of Nigerian Law is the customary laws. Note: before customary law will be considered as forming a source of Nigerian law, it must pass three tests, namely:
-         It must not be incompatible either directly or by implication with any law for the time-being in force of any written law.
-         It must pass the repugnancy test. This means that it must not be repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience – human sacrifice, enslavement, killing of twins, right to personal liberty.
-         It must not be contrary to public policy – as represented in the CFRN S 14(3): the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from few States or from few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.

CONCLUSION
            To this end we wish to wrap-up our discussion thus far with the understanding that Human rights are both inspirational and practical. Human rights principles hold up the vision of a free, just, and peaceful world and set minimum standards for how individuals and institutions everywhere should treat people. Human rights also empower people with a framework for action when those minimum standards are not met, for people still have human rights even if the laws or those in power do not recognize or protect them.
            It culminates then that the dignity of the human person as well as the attendant demand to accord the human person all of the rights that belong to him has informed different motifs behind the formulation of many charters and constitutions and declarations of human rights down the history of humanity as we have examined thus far. This stretches even to our present day, so much so that any pretence at underplaying this all important reality would only tantamount to a betrayal of our mandate and duty to promote Justice and Peace.

REFERENCES
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (with amendments 2011)

Igwebuike Okeke, The ‘Osu’ Concept in Igboland (Enugu: Access Publishers Ltd., 1986).

Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963
Obiora Ike (ed.,), the Fantasy of Human Rights (Enugu: Catholic Institute for Development Justice and Peace (CIDJP), 1997).
Osu Bill, 1956
Phillips O. Hood and Paul Jackson, Constitution and Administrative Law 6th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell 1978)
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)," Microsoft Encarta Premium 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008)

The World Book Encyclopedia 19th Vol. 15 pp. 710-712


[1] Obiora Ike, “Human Rights, Human Dignity and their Relevance for a Sustainable Functional Democracy in Nigeria” in Obiora Ike (ed.,), The Fantasy of Human Rights (Enugu: Catholic Institute for Development Justice and Peace (CIDJP), 1997). Pp 86-87
[2] Cf. Igwebuike Okeke, The ‘Osu’ Concept in Igboland (Enugu: Access Publishers Ltd., 1986). P 8-9
[3] Laws of Eastern Nigeria: 1963 caption 1, pp 1-2; Cf. Also Osu Bill, 1956
[4] Phillips O. Hood and Paul Jackson, Constitution and Administrative Law 6th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell 1978) p. 5

ON THE NATURE OF THE BEAUTIFUL


CHAPTER ONE
ON THE NATURE OF THE BEAUTIFUL              by Orjiebele Malachy
Classically the term ‘Beautiful’ is used for ascribing aesthetic qualities; where-in aesthetics connotes any experience or perception of the beautiful, in the things of nature as well as in the works of man. Some modern writers propose by contrast either that ‘beautiful’ is a mere catch-all term, roughly equivalent to ‘aesthetically commendable’; or that there is, as ordinary language suggests, a limitless plurality of aesthetic qualities (encompassing elegance, grace, poignancy, and so on) of which beauty is only one. In any case, the Beautiful has become synonymous with the Aesthetic, as such; Will Durant defines aesthetics as “the study of the nature of beauty.”[1]
This chapter therefore, sets out to understand the nature of the ‘Beautiful’ from the philosophical epochs, with a grand representation in Leo Tolstoy where-in he says that all aesthetic definitions of beauty lead to two fundamental conceptions of beauty. He further merges these conceptions into one to purport that beauty is that which pleases us. David Hume takes this up to emphasise the subjectivist conception of beauty, but sets out nonetheless to ascertain what will consist in a standard for the judgement of taste. The ensuing views from the foregoing finds an encompassing interpretation in Immanuel Kant and this serves as a footing for understanding the general framework of his aesthetic theory.
1.1       UNDERSTANDING THE BEAUTIFUL
            The classical understanding that takes it for granted that beauty is the only, or at least the fundamental term in ordinary language for ascribing aesthetic qualities brings out the nature of  beauty as one of the most enduring and controversial themes in Western philosophy, and is with art, one of the two fundamental issues in philosophical aesthetics. Most of those who have attempted to define beauty “agree that it involves a response of pleasure. We call something beautiful when it delights us or pleases us in some special way.”[2] But what causes this response on our part? Is it something in the object itself? Is it merely a subjective reaction on our part? Or is it some combination of these two?
We know from common experience that all persons do not find the same objects beautiful. What pleases some fails to please others. This is sometimes taken to mean that beauty exists in the eye of the beholder. But it can also mean that when a person’s taste is cultivated, he or she is able to appreciate the elements of beauty in objects which fail to please others because they have not yet learned to appreciate that beauty.  Hence the basic issue in the theory of beauty, namely: whether beauty is subjective - located ‘in the eye of the beholder’ - or whether it is an objective feature of beautiful things.
Whichever case, a pure version of either of these positions seems implausible. Many attempts have been made to split the difference or incorporate insights of both subjectivist and objectivist accounts, and this runs through the history of Western philosophical thought.
In the ancient account for the most part, beauty is located outside of anyone's particular experiences. The classical conception is that beauty consists of an arrangement of integral parts into a coherent whole, according to proportion, harmony, symmetry, and similar notions. This is a primordial Western conception of beauty, and is embodied in classical and neo-classical architecture, sculpture, literature, and music wherever they appear. Aristotle says in the Poetics that “to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must …present a certain order in its arrangement of parts”[3]. And in the Metaphysics: “The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree.”[4]
This Aristotelian conception is received in the medieval era by Thomas Aquinas who in a typically Aristotelian formulation, says that there are three main traits by which beauty is recognised. These are: “first, integrity or perfection – for if something is impaired it is ugly. Secondly, there is due proportion or consonance. And thirdly, clarity: whence things that are brightly coloured are called beautiful.”[5] Hence Aquinas proposes that for a thing to be regarded as beautiful, such a thing must subsist in order, unity, coherency, proportion, symmetry and so on.
In the modern era, beauty has become a contested concept in aesthetics, in the sense that some theorists have seen it as dispensable, and an obstacle to the perception of more detailed aesthetic values such as being sublime, harmonious, graceful, dainty, winsome, and elegant. For others it remains the central, unifying concept appropriate to pleasure derived from the senses or from intellectual conception. Santayana as a representative modern thinker defines beauty as ‘objectified pleasure.’  He says that
Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing. … Beauty is a value, that is, it is not a perception of a matter of fact or of a relation: it is an emotion, an affection of our volitional and appreciative nature. An object cannot be beautiful if it can give pleasure to nobody: a beauty to which all men were forever indifferent is a contradiction in terms. … Beauty is therefore a positive value that is intrinsic; it is a pleasure.[6]
These conceptions of beauty in the history of Western aesthetic thought, has been hitched together to result into a further conception by Leo Tolstoy. For Tolstoy, the definition of beauty which “suppose beauty to consist either in utility or in adjustment to purpose, or in symmetry, or in order, or in proportion, or in smoothness, or in harmony of the parts, or in unity amid variety, or in various combinations of these... is thoroughly inaccurate.”[7] To then proffer an ‘accurate’ understanding of the nature of the beautiful, he comes up with what he calls ‘two fundamental conceptions’ of beauty.
1.2       LEO TOLSTOY: TWO FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS OF BEAUTY
In What is Art, Tolstoy says that all aesthetic conceptions of beauty lead to two fundamental conceptions.
The first is that beauty is something having an independent existence (existing in itself), that it is one of the manifestations of the absolutely Perfect, of the Idea, of the Spirit, of Will, or of God; the other is that beauty is a kind of pleasure we receive which does not have personal advantage for its object.[8]
The first of these definitions was accepted by most of the German philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and so on. This objective-mystical definition of beauty is a conception typical of the medieval era as exemplified in the writings of Augustine and Aquinas. Thus beauty is viewed as something objective, mystical, a conception merging into that of the highest perfection, God – a definition founded on nothing. A conception of beauty that is very elevated, but unfortunately at the same time very indefinite and, consequently, embracing philosophy, religion, and life itself (as in the theories of Schelling and Hegel and their German and French followers).
The second view that beauty is a certain kind of pleasure we receive which does not have personal advantage for its aim, finds favour chiefly among the English aesthetic writers, such as Edmund Burke, Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and so on. This conception is a very simple and intelligible subjective one, which considers beauty to be that which pleases. Tolstoy notes that he does not add to the word ‘pleases’ the words ‘without the aim of advantage,’ because ‘pleases’ naturally presupposes the absence of the idea of profit. And this conception of beauty, although it seems very clear, is unfortunately, again inexact, for it widens out on the other side; that is, it includes the pleasure derived from drink, from food, from touching a delicate skin and so on.
This dual conception not seeming to lead to any headway, Tolstoy further merges into one these two conceptions of beauty. In going about this he says that in the subjective aspect, we call beauty that which supplies us with a particular kind of pleasure; while in the objective aspect, we call beauty something absolutely perfect, and we acknowledge it to be so only because we receive, from the manifestation of this absolute perfection, a certain kind of pleasure. So this objective definition is nothing but the subjective conception differently expressed. In reality “both conceptions of beauty amount to one and the same thing – namely, the reception by us of a certain kind of pleasure; that is, we call ‘beauty’ that which pleases us without evoking desire.”[9]
This merged conception finds expression in Hume as he says that a thing is appropriately called beautiful if and only if it provokes aesthetic sentiment in appropriately disposed competent judges, or put differently, the test of an object's beauty is the experience that it provokes in the observer. By so doing, he posits a subjective approach to the nature of the beautiful. Yet surprising enough seeks to couch a standard for the judgement of beauty in particular and of taste in general.

1.3       DAVID HUME: OF THE STANDARD OF TASTE
From the foregoing, Hume says that
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them, and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity where another is sensible of beauty, and every individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment without pretending to regulate those of others. To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry as to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to the disposition of the organs, the same object may be both sweet and bitter...[10]
And this is truly Humean as he would refuse to grant that any a priori rules can ground the validity of some judgments against their rivals.
Yet going further he seems to consider the other side of the coin and thus says that
it appears, then, that amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, there are certain general principles of approbation or blame whose influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. And that some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ. [11]
Thus he posits that many and frequent are the defects in the internal organs which prevent or weaken the influence of those general principles on which depends our sentiment of beauty or deformity.
Furthermore, Hume notes that “though some objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturally calculated to give pleasure, it is not to be expected, that in every individual the pleasure will be equally felt.”[12] And one obvious cause why many feel not the proper sentiment of beauty is the want (lack) of what he calls ‘delicacy of imagination’, which is requisite to convey a sensibility of those finer emotions. Thus he opines that “it is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men be reconciled; at least a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another.”[13]
To proffer what this standard would be, he starts by saying that reason, if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of the perception of taste; and that the same excellence of faculties which contributes to the improvement of reason, the same clearness of conception, the same exactness of distinction, the same vivacity of apprehension, are essential to the operations of true taste, and are its infallible concomitants. Thus though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely, the same in all men, yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty. These judges are indeed rare for they must possess strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.
Further on the issue, Hume argues that the verdicts of critics who possess those qualities tend to coincide, and approach unanimity in the long run. So the test of time, as assessed by the verdicts of the best critics, functions as something analogous to an objective standard. Though judgments of taste remain fundamentally subjective, and certain contemporary works or objects may appear irremediably controversial, the long-run consensus of people who are in a good position to judge, functions analogously to an objective standard and renders such standards unnecessary even if they could be identified. And finally, though we cannot directly find a standard of beauty that sets out the qualities that a thing must possess in order to be beautiful, we can describe the qualities of a good critic or a tasteful person. Then the long-run consensus of such persons is the practical standard of taste and the means of justifying judgments about beauty.
So far we realise that to define beauty in terms of pleasure would seem to make it relative to the individual, for what gives pleasure – even contemplative pleasure – to one man, may seem not to another. And so is the understanding that men differ in the degree to which they possess good perception – and sound critical judgement – even as objects differ in the degree to which they possess the elements of beauty. Beyond this controversy concerning the objectivity or subjectivity of beauty, lies a middle ground between the two extreme positions, which insists upon a beauty intrinsic to the object but does not deny the relevance of differences in individual sensibility. And this is very much exemplified in Immanuel Kant’s treatment on the nature of the beautiful.
1.4       IMMAANUEL KANT: SUBJECTIVE UNIVERSALITY OF BEAUTY
            Kant makes the claim that when we call something beautiful, it is because our faculty of Taste produces an ‘entirely disinterested satisfaction’, and because of this disinterest it must claim validity for everyone… that is, there must be bound up with it a title to subjective universality.[14] In other words, we are warranted in exacting from every one the pleasure or subjective finality of the representation in respect of the relation of the cognitive faculties engaged in the estimate of a sensible object in general.
            Thus the beautiful, according to Kant, ‘pleases immediately... apart from all interest.’ The pleasure that results from its contemplation may be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, there is no interest, whether of sense or reason. With it also there is no import which is “egoistic, but must necessarily, from its inner nature, be allowed a pluralistic validity.”[15] It becomes clear then that this claim of disinterest informs the aesthetic experience.
            The aesthetic experience is for Kant also unique in that its judgement is represented as universal, that is, valid for every man’ yet at the same time, it is incognisable by means of any universal concept. In other words, ‘all judgements of taste are singular judgements’, they are without concept in the sense that they do not apply to a class of objects. Nevertheless, they have certain universality and are not merely the formulation of private judgment. When “we call the object beautiful,” Kant says, “we believe ourselves to be speaking with a universal voice,”[16] and lay claim to the concurrence of every one, whereas as private sensation would be decisive except for the observer alone and his liking.
                In saying that aesthetic judgment have subjective not objective, universality, and in holding that the beautiful is the object of a universal satisfaction, Kant also seems to take a middle position which recognises the subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment without denying that beauty is somehow an intrinsic property of object. With regard to its subjective character Kant cites Hume to the effect that
although critics are able to reason more plausibly than cooks, they must still share the same fate. For the determining ground of their judgement they are not able to look to the force of demonstrations, but only to the reflection of the Subject upon his own taste (of pleasure or displeasure), to the exclusion of precepts and rules.[17]
            The universal character of the aesthetic judgment, however, keeps it from being completely subjective, and it grows to some length to refute the notion that in matters of the beautiful, one can seek refuge in the adage that ‘everyone has his own taste.’ The fact that the aesthetic judgment requires universal assent, even though the universal rule on which it is based cannot be formulated, does not, of course, preclude the failure of the object to win such assent from many individuals. Since not all men have good taste or, having it, have it to the same degree.[18]
            The foregoing consideration shows the connection between the definition of beauty and the problem of aesthetic training, or put differently, the connection between the definition of beauty and the cultivation and judgement of taste. The aspect of the definition of beauty being taken care of on the one hand, on the other, Kant outlines the study of ‘four moments in the judgement of taste,’ and this is the project of his ‘Analytic of the Beautiful.’
            To succinctly understand Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, we must necessarily understand the spirit of his critical philosophy, which is more of a consistent flow of thought from the Critique of Pure Reason, into the Critique of Practical Reason and the link or connectivity of these two in the Critique of Judgment, noting that Kant’s theory of the beautiful must be understood in the general context of his theory of knowledge. This then is the project of the succeeding chapter.
           


[1] Durant, Will, the Story of Philosophy, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1961). P 532
[2] Adler, J, Mortimer, Great Ideas from the Great Books, (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1967). P 240
[3] Aristotle, Poetics, vol. 2, 2322 [1450b34] as in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle Volume 2, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)
[4]­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­________, Metaphysics, vol. 2 1705 [1078a36]. Ibid. 
[5] Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica I (13th century), trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London: Christian Classics, 1981). P 39
[6] Santayana, George, the Sense of Beauty, (New York: Scribner's Press, 1896). Pp 50–51
[7] Tolstoy, Leo, What is Art? as in Dickie G and Sclafoni R J (Eds.), Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology.(New York: St Martin’s Press ,1977) P.59
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Hume, David, Of the Standard of Taste as in Dickie G and Sclafoni R J (Eds.), Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology.(New York: St Martin’s Press ,1977). P 594
[11] Ibid. P 596
[12] Ibid. P 596-597
[13] Ibid. P 594
[14] Kant explains that in order to be justified in claiming universal agreement for an aesthetic judgment merely resting on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) that the subjective conditions of this faculty of aesthetic judgments are identical with all men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties, there brought into action, with a view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as otherwise men would be incapable of communicating their representations or even their knowledge; (2) that the judgment has paid regard merely to this relation (consequently merely to the formal condition of  the faculty of judgment), and is pure, that is, is free from confusion either with concepts of the objects or sensations as determining grounds. If any mistake is made in this latter point, this only touches the incorrect application to a particular case of the right which a law gives us, and does not do away with the right generally (Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Judgement (trans., Meredith, C, James) in Adler, J, Mortimer (ed.), Great Books of the Western World: 39, Kant, (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1990), footnotes. P 517
[15] Ibid. P 511
[16] Guyer, Paul, Bridging the Gulf: Kant’s Project in the Third Critique in Bird, Graham, (ed.,) A Companion to Kant, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006). P 427
[17] (Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Judgement (trans., Meredith, C, James) in Adler, J, Mortimer (ed.), Great Books of the Western World: 39, Kant, op cit. § 34. P 515
[18] Adler J, Mortimer (ed.,), Great Books of the Western World: The Syntopicon I, Beauty, op cit. P 90-91