CHAPTER
ONE
ON THE NATURE OF THE BEAUTIFUL by Orjiebele Malachy
Classically the
term ‘Beautiful’ is used for ascribing aesthetic qualities; where-in aesthetics
connotes any experience or perception of the beautiful, in the things of nature
as well as in the works of man. Some modern writers propose by contrast either
that ‘beautiful’ is a mere catch-all term, roughly equivalent to ‘aesthetically
commendable’; or that there is, as ordinary language suggests, a limitless
plurality of aesthetic qualities (encompassing elegance, grace, poignancy, and
so on) of which beauty is only one. In any case, the Beautiful has become
synonymous with the Aesthetic, as such; Will Durant defines aesthetics as “the
study of the nature of beauty.”[1]
This chapter therefore, sets out to understand
the nature of the ‘Beautiful’ from the philosophical epochs, with a grand
representation in Leo Tolstoy where-in he says that all aesthetic definitions
of beauty lead to two fundamental conceptions of beauty. He further merges
these conceptions into one to purport that beauty is that which pleases us.
David Hume takes this up to emphasise the subjectivist conception of beauty,
but sets out nonetheless to ascertain what will consist in a standard for the
judgement of taste. The ensuing views from the foregoing finds an encompassing
interpretation in Immanuel Kant and this serves as a footing for understanding
the general framework of his aesthetic theory.
1.1 UNDERSTANDING THE
BEAUTIFUL
The
classical understanding that takes it for granted that beauty is the only, or
at least the fundamental term in ordinary language for ascribing aesthetic
qualities brings out the nature of beauty as one of the most enduring and
controversial themes in Western philosophy, and is with art, one of the two
fundamental issues in philosophical aesthetics. Most of those
who have attempted to define beauty “agree that it involves a response of
pleasure. We call something beautiful when it delights us or pleases us in some
special way.”[2]
But what causes this response on our part? Is it something in the object
itself? Is it merely a subjective reaction on our part? Or is it some
combination of these two?
We know from
common experience that all persons do not find the same objects beautiful. What
pleases some fails to please others. This is sometimes taken to mean that
beauty exists in the eye of the beholder. But it can also mean that when a
person’s taste is cultivated, he or she is able to appreciate the elements of
beauty in objects which fail to please others because they have not yet learned
to appreciate that beauty. Hence the basic issue in the theory of
beauty, namely: whether beauty is subjective - located ‘in the eye of the
beholder’ - or whether it is an objective feature of beautiful things.
Whichever case,
a
pure version of either of these positions seems implausible. Many attempts have
been made to split the difference or incorporate insights of both subjectivist
and objectivist accounts, and this runs through the history of Western
philosophical thought.
In the ancient account for the
most part, beauty is located outside of anyone's particular experiences. The
classical conception is that beauty consists of an arrangement of integral
parts into a coherent whole, according to proportion, harmony, symmetry, and
similar notions. This is a primordial Western conception of beauty, and is
embodied in classical and neo-classical architecture, sculpture, literature,
and music wherever they appear. Aristotle says in the Poetics that “to
be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must
…present a certain order in its arrangement of parts”[3].
And in the Metaphysics: “The chief forms of beauty are order and
symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a
special degree.”[4]
This Aristotelian conception
is received in the medieval era by Thomas Aquinas who in a typically
Aristotelian formulation, says that there are three main traits by which beauty
is recognised. These are: “first, integrity or perfection – for if something is
impaired it is ugly. Secondly, there is due proportion or consonance. And
thirdly, clarity: whence things that are brightly coloured are called beautiful.”[5]
Hence Aquinas proposes that for a thing to be regarded as beautiful, such a
thing must subsist in order, unity, coherency, proportion, symmetry and so on.
In the modern era, beauty has
become a contested concept in aesthetics, in the sense that some theorists have
seen it as dispensable, and an obstacle to the perception of more detailed
aesthetic values such as being sublime, harmonious, graceful, dainty, winsome, and
elegant. For others it remains the central, unifying concept appropriate to
pleasure derived from the senses or from intellectual conception. Santayana as
a representative modern thinker defines beauty as ‘objectified pleasure.’ He says that
Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a
thing. … Beauty is a value, that is, it is not a perception of a matter of fact
or of a relation: it is an emotion, an affection of our volitional and
appreciative nature. An object cannot be beautiful if it can give pleasure to
nobody: a beauty to which all men were forever indifferent is a contradiction
in terms. … Beauty is therefore a positive value that is intrinsic; it is a
pleasure.[6]
These conceptions of beauty in
the history of Western aesthetic thought, has been hitched together to result
into a further conception by Leo Tolstoy. For Tolstoy, the definition of beauty
which “suppose beauty to consist either in utility or in adjustment to purpose,
or in symmetry, or in order, or in proportion, or in smoothness, or in harmony
of the parts, or in unity amid variety, or in various combinations of these...
is thoroughly inaccurate.”[7] To
then proffer an ‘accurate’ understanding of the nature of the beautiful, he
comes up with what he calls ‘two fundamental conceptions’ of beauty.
1.2 LEO TOLSTOY: TWO FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS
OF BEAUTY
In What is Art, Tolstoy says that all
aesthetic conceptions of beauty lead to two fundamental conceptions.
The first is that beauty
is something having an independent existence (existing in itself), that it is
one of the manifestations of the absolutely Perfect, of the Idea, of the
Spirit, of Will, or of God; the other is that beauty is a kind of pleasure we
receive which does not have personal advantage for its object.[8]
The first of
these definitions was accepted by most of the German philosophers such as
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and so on. This objective-mystical
definition of beauty is a conception typical of the medieval era as exemplified
in the writings of Augustine and Aquinas. Thus beauty is viewed as something
objective, mystical, a conception merging into that of the highest perfection,
God – a definition founded on nothing. A conception of beauty that is very
elevated, but unfortunately at the same time very indefinite and, consequently,
embracing philosophy, religion, and life itself (as in the theories of
Schelling and Hegel and their German and French followers).
The second view that
beauty is a certain kind of pleasure we receive which does not have personal
advantage for its aim, finds favour chiefly among the English aesthetic
writers, such as Edmund Burke, Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and so on.
This conception is a very simple and intelligible subjective one, which
considers beauty to be that which pleases. Tolstoy notes that he does not add
to the word ‘pleases’ the words ‘without the aim of advantage,’ because
‘pleases’ naturally presupposes the absence of the idea of profit. And this
conception of beauty, although it seems very clear, is unfortunately, again
inexact, for it widens out on the other side; that is, it includes the pleasure
derived from drink, from food, from touching a delicate skin and so on.
This dual
conception not seeming to lead to any headway, Tolstoy further merges into one
these two conceptions of beauty. In going about this he says that in the
subjective aspect, we call beauty that which supplies us with a particular kind
of pleasure; while in the objective aspect, we call beauty something absolutely
perfect, and we acknowledge it to be so only because we receive, from the
manifestation of this absolute perfection, a certain kind of pleasure. So this
objective definition is nothing but the subjective conception differently
expressed. In reality “both conceptions of beauty amount to one and the same
thing – namely, the reception by us of a certain kind of pleasure; that is, we
call ‘beauty’ that which pleases us without evoking desire.”[9]
This
merged conception finds expression in Hume as he says that a thing is appropriately called beautiful if and
only if it provokes aesthetic sentiment in appropriately disposed competent
judges, or put differently, the test of an object's beauty is the experience
that it provokes in the observer. By so doing, he posits a subjective approach
to the nature of the beautiful. Yet surprising enough seeks to couch a standard
for the judgement of beauty in particular and of taste in general.
1.3 DAVID
HUME: OF THE STANDARD
OF TASTE
From
the foregoing, Hume says that
Beauty
is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which
contemplates them, and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may
even perceive deformity where another is sensible of beauty, and every
individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment without pretending to
regulate those of others. To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as
fruitless an enquiry as to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According
to the disposition of the organs, the same object may be both sweet and
bitter...[10]
And this is
truly Humean as he would refuse to
grant that any a priori rules can ground the validity of some judgments against
their rivals.
Yet going
further he seems to consider the other side of the coin and thus says that
it
appears, then, that amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, there are
certain general principles of approbation or blame whose influence a careful
eye may trace in all operations of the mind. And that some particular forms or
qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated
to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any
particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the
organ. [11]
Thus he posits
that many and frequent are the defects in the internal organs which prevent or
weaken the influence of those general principles on which depends our sentiment
of beauty or deformity.
Furthermore,
Hume notes that “though some objects, by the structure of the mind, be
naturally calculated to give pleasure, it is not to be expected, that in every
individual the pleasure will be equally felt.”[12]
And one obvious cause why many feel not the proper sentiment of beauty is the
want (lack) of what he calls ‘delicacy of imagination’, which is requisite to
convey a sensibility of those finer emotions. Thus he opines that “it is
natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various
sentiments of men be reconciled; at least a decision, afforded, confirming one
sentiment, and condemning another.”[13]
To
proffer what this standard would be, he starts by saying that reason, if not an
essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of the
perception of taste; and that the same excellence of
faculties which contributes to the improvement of reason, the same clearness of
conception, the same exactness of distinction, the same vivacity of
apprehension, are essential to the operations of true taste, and are its
infallible concomitants. Thus though the principles of taste be universal, and
nearly, if not entirely, the same in all men, yet few are qualified to give
judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard
of beauty. These judges are indeed rare for they must possess strong sense,
united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison,
and cleared of all prejudice; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are
to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.
Further on the issue, Hume
argues that the verdicts of critics who possess those qualities tend to
coincide, and approach unanimity in the long run. So the test of time, as
assessed by the verdicts of the best critics, functions as something analogous
to an objective standard. Though judgments of taste remain fundamentally
subjective, and certain contemporary works or objects may appear irremediably
controversial, the long-run consensus of people who are in a good position to
judge, functions analogously to an objective standard and renders such
standards unnecessary even if they could be identified. And finally, though we
cannot directly find a standard of beauty that sets out the qualities that a
thing must possess in order to be beautiful, we can describe the qualities of a
good critic or a tasteful person. Then the long-run consensus of such persons
is the practical standard of taste and the means of justifying judgments about
beauty.
So far we
realise that to define beauty in terms of pleasure would seem to make it
relative to the individual, for what gives pleasure – even contemplative
pleasure – to one man, may seem not to another. And so is the understanding
that men differ in the degree to which they possess good perception – and sound
critical judgement – even as objects differ in the degree to which they possess
the elements of beauty. Beyond this controversy concerning the objectivity or
subjectivity of beauty, lies a middle ground between the two extreme positions,
which insists upon a beauty intrinsic to the object but does not deny the
relevance of differences in individual sensibility. And this is very much
exemplified in Immanuel Kant’s treatment on the nature of the beautiful.
1.4 IMMAANUEL
KANT: SUBJECTIVE UNIVERSALITY OF BEAUTY
Kant makes the claim that when we call something
beautiful, it is because our faculty of Taste produces an ‘entirely
disinterested satisfaction’, and because of this disinterest it must claim
validity for everyone… that is, there must be bound up with it a title to
subjective universality.[14] In
other words, we are warranted in exacting from every one the pleasure or
subjective finality of the representation in respect of the relation of the
cognitive faculties engaged in the estimate of a sensible object in general.
Thus the beautiful,
according to Kant, ‘pleases immediately... apart from all interest.’ The
pleasure that results from its contemplation may be said to be the one and only
disinterested and free delight; for, with it, there is no interest, whether of
sense or reason. With it also there is no import which is “egoistic, but must
necessarily, from its inner nature, be allowed a pluralistic validity.”[15]
It becomes clear then that this claim of disinterest informs the aesthetic
experience.
The aesthetic
experience is for Kant also unique in that its judgement is represented as
universal, that is, valid for every man’ yet at the same time, it is
incognisable by means of any universal concept. In other words, ‘all judgements
of taste are singular judgements’, they are without concept in the sense that
they do not apply to a class of objects. Nevertheless, they have certain
universality and are not merely the formulation of private judgment. When “we
call the object beautiful,” Kant says, “we believe ourselves to be speaking
with a universal voice,”[16]
and lay claim to the concurrence of every one, whereas as private sensation
would be decisive except for the observer alone and his liking.
In saying that aesthetic judgment have subjective
not objective, universality, and in holding that the beautiful is the object of
a universal satisfaction, Kant also seems to take a middle position which
recognises the subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment without denying that
beauty is somehow an intrinsic property of object. With regard to its
subjective character Kant cites Hume to the effect that
although
critics are able to reason more plausibly than cooks, they must still share the
same fate. For the determining ground of their judgement they are not able to look
to the force of demonstrations, but only to the reflection of the Subject upon
his own taste (of pleasure or displeasure), to the exclusion of precepts and
rules.[17]
The universal character
of the aesthetic judgment, however, keeps it from being completely subjective,
and it grows to some length to refute the notion that in matters of the
beautiful, one can seek refuge in the adage that ‘everyone has his own taste.’
The fact that the aesthetic judgment requires universal assent, even though the
universal rule on which it is based cannot be formulated, does not, of course,
preclude the failure of the object to win such assent from many individuals.
Since not all men have good taste or, having it, have it to the same degree.[18]
The foregoing
consideration shows the connection between the definition of beauty and the
problem of aesthetic training, or put differently, the connection between the
definition of beauty and the cultivation and judgement of taste. The aspect of
the definition of beauty being taken care of on the one hand, on the other,
Kant outlines the study of ‘four moments in the judgement of taste,’ and this
is the project of his ‘Analytic of the Beautiful.’
To succinctly
understand Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, we must necessarily understand
the spirit of his critical philosophy, which is more of a consistent flow of
thought from the Critique of Pure Reason,
into the Critique of Practical Reason
and the link or connectivity of these two in the Critique of Judgment, noting that Kant’s theory of the beautiful
must be understood in the general context of his theory of knowledge. This then
is the project of the succeeding chapter.
[1] Durant, Will, the Story of Philosophy, (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1961). P 532
[2] Adler, J,
Mortimer, Great Ideas from the Great
Books, (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1967). P 240
[3] Aristotle, Poetics, vol. 2, 2322 [1450b34] as in
Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle Volume 2, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984)
[5] Aquinas, Thomas, Summa
Theologica I (13th century), trans., Fathers of the English
Dominican Province, (London: Christian Classics, 1981). P 39
[7] Tolstoy, Leo, What is Art? as in Dickie G and Sclafoni
R J (Eds.), Aesthetics: A Critical
Anthology.(New York: St Martin’s Press ,1977) P.59
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Hume, David, Of the Standard of Taste as in Dickie G
and Sclafoni R J (Eds.), Aesthetics: A
Critical Anthology.(New York: St Martin’s Press ,1977). P 594
[11] Ibid. P 596
[12] Ibid. P 596-597
[13] Ibid. P 594
[14] Kant explains that in order to
be justified in claiming universal agreement for an aesthetic judgment merely
resting on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) that the
subjective conditions of this faculty of aesthetic judgments are identical with
all men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties, there brought
into action, with a view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as
otherwise men would be incapable of communicating their representations or even
their knowledge; (2) that the judgment has paid regard merely to this relation
(consequently merely to the formal condition of
the faculty of judgment), and is pure, that is, is free from confusion
either with concepts of the objects or sensations as determining grounds. If
any mistake is made in this latter point, this only touches the incorrect
application to a particular case of the right which a law gives us, and does
not do away with the right generally (Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Judgement (trans., Meredith, C, James) in Adler, J,
Mortimer (ed.), Great Books of the
Western World: 39, Kant, (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1990),
footnotes. P 517
[15] Ibid. P 511
[16] Guyer, Paul, Bridging the Gulf: Kant’s Project in the
Third Critique in Bird, Graham, (ed.,) A
Companion to Kant, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006). P 427
[17] (Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Judgement (trans.,
Meredith, C, James) in Adler, J, Mortimer (ed.), Great Books of the Western World: 39, Kant, op cit. § 34. P 515
[18] Adler J, Mortimer (ed.,), Great Books of the Western World: The Syntopicon
I, Beauty, op cit. P 90-91
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